argue for a similar conclusion, but do not identify or utilize the more general mechanism of the movable objective present. They argue that hypertime is the key feature that allows the generalization of the model; here I argue that MOP is also essential to the model.
Inwagen's discussion is aimed at preventing paradox by changing the past, but I argue that it provides metaphysical tools for a new model of time travel that can be generalized to all theories of time. 1 I owe thanks to audiences at the 2014 Pacific APA and the Gargnano Philosophy of Time Conference for feedback on this paper. I am also grateful to Melissa Schumacher and Heather Wallace for helpful comments. 2 Hudson and Wasserman (2010) argue for a similar conclusion, but do not identify or utilize the more general mechanism of the movable objective present. They argue that hypertime is the key feature that allows the generalization of the model; here I argue that MOP is also essential to the model.
THEORIES OF TIME AND TIME TRAVEL
Before delving into models of time travel, it will be helpful to discuss relevant views on the metaphysics of time. Eternalism holds that all times are equally real. There is no meaningful metaphysical distinction between the past, present, and future; Abraham Lincoln is just as real as the iPhone 47. Whether or not one is located in the present is merely a matter of perspective, akin to whether or not one is located "here" in the spatial manifold.
Presentism holds that only the present is real. Everything that exists is present; nonpresent things do not exist.
Growing block holds that the past and present are real. The growing blockist shares the eternalist's belief in the reality of the past, but stipulates that the present is the "growing edge" of being. With every passing moment, the total amount of being expands.
There are additional questions about the existence and metaphysical status of the objective present. Roughly, the existence of an "objective present" implies that a present time slice is metaphysically privileged in some way. Eternalism, presentism, and growing block vary with respect to the existence of a privileged or objective present. Eternalism denies the existence of such a privileged present, though often includes a subjective present that consists in the perspective of being present without metaphysical privilege. Moving spotlight holds that the present is privileged within the eternalist block by a kind of spotlight that "illuminates" temporally successive slices of the universe. Presentism implies the existence of an objective present by holding that what exists just is the objective present.
Growing block holds that the objective present corresponds with the forward-moving bleeding edge of existence.
Whether or not there is an objective present has deep and important implications for models of time travel, and I will not give an argument for its existence here. Nor will I take a stand on which view of time is correct. I will only work with theories of time that accept an objective present: presentism, growing block, and moving spotlight theory. I will also assume that we can make sense of the idea of an objective present, and that it can ground a certain Similarly, van Inwagian time travel results in a durational discrepancy between time and hypertime. Suppose that hypertime is finite and that it lasts for 1000 temporal units.
Normally, the quantity of existence of the growing block universe grows steadily in such a way that time and hypertime agree on its duration: when existence is 400 temporal units long, hyperexistence is also 400 temporal units long. But time travel in which a portion of the growing block is erased generates hypertemporal duration that exceeds temporal According to Lewis (1976) 5 Technically, the location of the present need not be under the control of the time traveller herself. For example, there could be a "jumpy" objective present that spontaneously switches locations in hypertime, and is not under a time traveller's control. Here I set aside such cases. 6 Hudson and Wasserman (2010) suggest this as well.
MOP requires the existence of an objective present. Presentism, moving spotlight, and growing block agree on its existence, but disagree on its nature. I do not take a stand on this important issue here, but I do make a few assumptions. First, I assume that the objective present is causally receptive: those existing within it are able to push, pull, move, and change features of reality. The present reality is dynamic and changeable. Whatever distinguishes the objective present from other temporal locations, one of its distinctive features is its receptivity to modification and change. 7 Looking down at the temporal manifold, the
Intelligence thus sees at least one temporal part of Reality glimmering with change and activity. Second, I assume that the objective present is maximally temporally thin: it is the smallest unit of time rather than, e.g., a year-long temporal part of the block. 
Presentist MOP. It is generally thought that time travel is incompatible with
presentism, for the reason that no destination exists to which the time traveler can depart.
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At best, she has no destination to which to travel; at worst, the time traveler effectively kills herself by flipping the switch in the time machine. This is commonly known as the "No Destinations" problem for time travel in a presentist universe. and that she is happy in second-time-around 1970 as a result (t2).
Without time travel, the location of the objective present is successively ordered. For example, it is located at t1, at t2, at t3, and then at t4. With time travel, temporal locations of the objective present are repeated: the objective present is located at 1969 several times over.
The Intelligence views the location of the objective present in the following hyperchronological order: t1/ht1, t2/ht2, t3/ht3, t1/ht4, t2/ht5. As Bianca arrives in 1969, the Intelligence sees the objective present "jump" backwards in the block.
As on the growing block model, moving spotlight MOP requires that the hyperpresent block regenerate and replace the old block in hypertemporal succession. At t3, Bianca relocates the illuminating spotlight of the present to 1969. Upon her arrival, a new hyperpresent block is generated that contains both her arrival and her attendance at Woodstock: the shared slice between the hyperearlier block and the block that replaces it.
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At each hypermoment, a spotlight illuminates a portion of the block. With the addition of time travel, the block is replaced by a new block and, presumably, a new spotlight: the spotlight shone on the time traveller.
MOP ERRORS AND EXTANT QUESTIONS
The possible errors of the MOP mechanism are many. First, we can imagine the all-important first switch making a mistake and taking too little or too much of present reality with it. Suppose that Bianca jumps into her time machine in 2013 and flips both switches.
But unbeknownst to her, the temporal relocation switch malfunctions: rather than transport Bianca and her time machine to 1969, it transports only the time machine. Bianca is out of luck: the objective present has been relocated without her and her time machine is missing.
More seriously, if her malfunction occurs in a presentist universe, she has taken her Woodstock-desiring self out of existence, since the objective present is relocated to the past without her. If the malfunction occurs in a growing block or a moving spotlight universe, then the slice of Reality shared by the hyperolder block and the hypernew block shares the time machine but lacks Bianca. Either way, the past has been changed, but only by the presence of the time machine: Bianca has lost her chance.
Or suppose that the temporal relocation switch malfunctions in the other direction, MOP also reveals the intricate relationships between the objective present, the passage of time, existence, and hypertime. While time travel is normally considered an outré test case for theories of time, MOP reveals that time travel can be utilized as a novel conceptual tool for modeling these relationships in further detail.
